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American Tianxia: The United States 
as the New “Middle Kingdom” 
 
The rise of China in the wake of the slow relative decline of the United States 
has been the overarching narrative of global studies since the beginning of this 
century. Is this narrative correct? China’s growth is slowing as it reaches middle 
income status and the United States is still overwhelmingly more wealthy and 
powerful than China. If China will someday “overtake” the United States, it will 
not happen for decades or centuries, depending what is meant by overtaking. But 
even this more guarded account of US decline is colored by an outdated, state-
centric view of human society. The twenty-first century world-system is centered 
on the United States but not contained within it; individuals all over the world 
participate in hierarchies of distinction that are fundamentally American in 
ideology and orientation. Whether or not they agree with US policy, support the 
US president, or are even able to enter the United States, success-oriented 
individuals choose to live in an American world—or accept global social 
exclusion. This is just as true in China as anywhere else, and perhaps even more 
true for Chinese individuals than for anyone else. 
  
Excerpted from American Tianxia: Chinese Money, American Power, and the End of 
History, Policy Press, 2017. Reprinted with permission. 
  
From the dawn of history until the long sixteenth century, China was the 
economic, political, and cultural center of East Asia. It was arguably the most 
important economic center in the world. Contemporary China is the lineal 
descendant of a civilization that stretches back at least 4000 years and has always 
existed in situ where it still exists today. More important than its sheer age, it is 
still being used in the same geographical space by people who identify themselves 
as being of the same culture ‒ and indeed of the same race—as its prehistoric 
inventors. China was first unified politically in 221 BC by the Qin Emperor (r. 
221‒210 BC) but it was a single political space at least a thousand years before 
that. When Confucius wandered from state to state in the early fifth century BC 
offering (mostly unwanted) advice on how to rule in a just manner, he understood 
China as a single political system and his patrons as participants in that system. 
The Chinese people and the Chinese language have long recognized the 
coherence of China as a unified political system, even if China has often been 
divided into multiple warring polities. The name the Chinese give to their own 
country is Zhongguo. The word is literally translatable as “Central State” or 
“Central States” (there is no plural inflection in Chinese). It is more evocatively 
translated into English as “Middle Kingdom.” China is not the land of the Chin (as 
it is in English, referring to the Qin Emperor) or the land of the Han (the majority 
ethnic group of China). It is simply and matter-of-factly the central state or states 
in the same self-evident way that for the Greco-Roman world the Mediterranean 
was the middle sea. It didn’t need a proper name of its own. 
Unlike classical and medieval Western geography, which always placed its 
own civilization on the northwestern edge of the known world, Chinese geography 
has always located China in the middle. The traditional Chinese “Five Zone” 
theory organized the Chinese world into concentric circles: first the royal domain 
of lands under the personal lordship of the emperor, then the domains of the 
emperor’s Chinese subsidiary lords, and then the conquered kingdoms of non-
Chinese peoples, the internal barbarians (these three zones being inside the 
Chinese empire itself). Outside these three civilized zones were the tributary 
barbarians, who sent customary tribute to the emperor’s court as a token of 
submission, and the “wild” barbarians, who did not. The first three zones were in 
theory subject to Chinese law, while countries in the two outer zones were free to 
live according to their own customs. The five zones taken together formed the 
Chinese tianxia (literally “sky beneath,” idiomatically “all under heaven”). 
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The concept of tianxia has existed throughout 
Chinese history but its meaning and implications have 
shifted over the centuries. Originally applied to 
encompass the literal whole world, early on it came to 
represent what the historian Wang Gungwu calls in 
his book Renewal “an enlightened realm that 
Confucian thinkers and mandarins raised to one of 
universal values that determined who was civilized and who was not.” It referred 
to the political system of which China was the central state (or states), not to the 
geographical world, which might extend to such remote and exotic places as the 
Roman Empire. The historical Chinese tianxia corresponded, roughly speaking, to 
East Asia and the adjacent regions of Central Asia, a region in which China was 
(and is again) by far the economically, politically, and culturally preponderant 
country. From the apparently prehistoric emergence of a common Chinese 
consciousness until the crisis of January 7, 1841, when a single British ship sank 
an entire Chinese fleet in less than four hours, China was the central state (or 
states) of the East Asian political system. 
  
Hierarchy and peace 
The First Opium War of 1840-1842 shattered the Pax Sinica. China’s East 
Asian tianxia was hardly an idyllic world of peace and good feelings before the 
British arrived, but does seem to have been relatively peaceful, especially when 
compared to similar periods in European history. The political scientist David 
Kang argues in East Asia before the West that there were only four major 
international wars during the three centuries of Ming rule among the states that 
were subject to the Ming tributary system, and the last of those wars hardly counts, 
considering that it was the one that brought the system to an end. The international 
relations of the ensuing Qing dynasty were even more stable. Kang certainly 
overstates the peacefulness of the system by classifying away many lower-level 
conflicts. Nonetheless, his argument is not without merit. Just one major war per 
century is surely a record to be envied, however many minor wars may have 
continued to be fought year in and year out. But should this record of major power 
peace be attributed to the relationalism of the Ming tianxia, or to its hierarchy? 
Our own era may seem to be one of endless warfare, but when you take a step 
back to look at the data it also turns out to be remarkably peaceful. Since 1945 
there has not been a single major, internationally-recognized change in the 
international borders between the countries of the world that resulted from warfare. 
In the decolonization of the mid-twentieth century many internal borders became 
international borders, a process repeated again with the breakup of the Soviet 
Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia in the early 1990s. Sometimes these 
processes of disintegration were characterized by terrible violence, as in the 
partitions of India and Yugoslavia, and several former Portuguese colonies were 
violently seized by post-colonial countries (Goa, East Timor). Many countries have 
also experienced and are experiencing civil wars. But outright wars between 
countries on the model of the previous 3000 years of human political history have 
been rare, and when they have occurred the most common outcome has been a 
return to the pre-war borders. The right of conquest seems to be a thing of the past. 
There are limited exceptions that prove the general rule, most prominently the 
Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967 and the Russian annexation of Crimea 
in 2014. Neither of these annexations has received widespread international 
recognition. This might be credited to the new institutionalism in international 
relations, were it not for the fact that illegal, de facto annexations are also rare. 
East Jerusalem and Crimea are exceptions, not the rule. The rule seems to be that 
countries don’t invade other countries anymore, and when they do invade other 
countries they do so with limited objectives and withdraw to the pre-war borders 
once those objectives have been met. Sometimes they maintain an open-ended 
state of uncertainty, as exemplified by Russia’s many frozen conflicts with its 
neighbors. But veni, vidi, vici seems to be a thing of the past. Among Western 
developed countries, including the United States, the whole idea of using military 
power to conquer adjoining territories is considered mad. 
It is ironic that just as the United States became the most powerful country in 
the world, it stopped using its military power to acquire territory. The United 
States repeatedly used force throughout the nineteenth century to extend its 
frontiers across North America to the Pacific Ocean, to establish a settler colony on 
Hawaii in the 1890s, and finally to seize its first colonial possessions in the 
Spanish‒American War of 1898. And then it stopped. At the Paris Peace 
Conference that followed the end of World War I, the United States was perhaps 
the only country that did not press claims for the expansion (or preservation) of its 
territory. The Treaty of Versailles is often portrayed as a failure because it did not 
prevent the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But considering that 
the United States hardly registered as a European power a mere 10 years before, it 
should perhaps be reappraised as a substantial US diplomatic accomplishment. 
The historical memory of World War I has come to be so overshadowed by the 
tragedies and triumphs of World War II that it is difficult to remember now just 
how dominant the United States was then. At the signing of the Treaty of 
Versailles in 1919 the GDP of the United States was equal to that of the United 
Kingdom, Germany, Russia, and Japan combined. Despite the enormous physical 
size of the British and French empires, contemporaries were well-aware that the 
United States pulled the strings that mattered in global affairs, particularly the 
financial strings. In his 1921 book Cross Currents in Europe Today, the American 
historian Charles Beard told an amusing though sadly unsourced anecdote about 
this, quoting “a keen French economist” as saying: 
  
One fact dominates all others: the rise of the United States to world hegemony. Lord 
Robert Cecil [architect of the League of Nations] has compared the position of the 
United States after the Great War with that of Great Britain after the Napoleonic wars. 
That comparison is not quite exact; because the British hegemony was then essentially 
European while that of the United States today is universal. 
  
This is not mere American swagger. In their 1923 book The Prospects of 
Industrial Civilization, the British philosophers Bertrand and Dora Russell agreed. 
Regarding the future of relations between the United States and the United 
Kingdom, they reasoned that: 
  
one of two things must happen, either an alliance in which the British Empire would take 
second place, or a war in which the British Empire would be dissolved. An alliance 
would only be possible if we sincerely abandoned all furtherance of our own imperialism 
and all opposition to that of America. If this should happen, an English-speaking block 
could very largely control the world, and make first-class wars improbable during its 
existence. 
  
Russell and Russell’s mooted Anglo-American alliance was not forthcoming at 
the time, with the result that several more “first-class wars” were fought, 
culminating in World War II. Even after World War II, the United Kingdom did 
not “sincerely abandon all furtherance of its own imperialism” and subordinate its 
foreign policy to the imperative of maintaining its “special relationship” with the 
United States until after the Suez Crisis of 1956. Half a century later, the United 
Kingdom and its Anglo-Saxon former dominions (Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand) are extraordinarily well-integrated into American power structures, 
especially military ones. The Reagan‒Thatcher alliance has been credited with 
bringing about the fall of the Soviet Union, and whether or not that is an 
overstatement it is clearly true that there have been no “first-class wars” since the 
solidification of the Anglo-Saxon alliance system half a century ago. 
  
Toward an American Tianxia 
Like the United States in the early twentieth century, the United Kingdom after the 
middle of the twentieth century ceased to use force to impose its rule on foreigners. 
Most of the rest of the world followed suit. It is surely intriguing that when France 
withdrew from Vietnam in 1954, the United States did not take over its colonial 
occupation. However misguided the US involvement in Vietnam may have been, it 
was a war to support one indigenous regime over another, not a war to impose a 
US regime. This is typical of the use of US power since 1900 and absolutely 
characteristic of the use of US power since 1950: the United States uses military 
force to influence modes of governance within countries, not to change the borders 
of countries. The American global order is a status quo order with respect to 
countries’ international borders but an interventionist order with respect to 
countries’ internal affairs. This is a radically new approach to international 
relations. 
The definitive principle of modern sovereignty was always the principle of 
non-interference in the internal affairs of countries. This principle, though never 
absolute, is now absolutely defunct. In the post-war period the United States and 
the Soviet Union repeatedly asserted a right to interfere in the internal affairs of 
their allies and associates, in effect waging a global proxy war for influence within 
the borders of other countries. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 
the United States has been the only serious force ordering the internal affairs of 
other countries on a global scale. Russia attempts to do so, but with limited success 
and mainly inside the borders of the former Soviet Union. The United States, by 
contrast, has deep civil and military relationships on every continent, including 
permanent military facilities in dozens of countries around the world. 
The remarkable stability of international borders since the middle of the 
twentieth century, coupled with the shredding of the Westphalian principle of non-
interference in internal affairs, suggests that some powerful overarching force is 
ordering and stabilizing the contemporary world-system. When it is observed that 
the United States alone possesses such powerful overarching force, and frequently 
uses it, the case is complete. Just as China has always been the central state of East 
Asia, the United States is today the central state of the world. That doesn’t mean 
that the United States dictates the actions of every country in the world. But it does 
mean that most of the countries of the world accede to American global leadership, 
both in their rhetoric and in their actions. The political scientist Yuen Foong 
Khong calls this the “American Tributary System” by explicit comparison to the 
Ming Dynasty tributary system. A better term might be the “American Tianxia.” In 
his 2013 book Renewal,Wang Gungwu was the first to suggest that: 
  
Today … an American tianxia has a strong global presence. It has a missionary drive 
that is backed by unmatched military power and political influence. Compared to the 
Chinese concept, it is not passive and defensive; rather, unlike other universal ideals, it is 
supported by a greater capacity to expand. 
  
The American Tianxia is, in essence, a graded global 
club that people can join only if they behave in 
civilizationally-appropriate ways—and then pay a 
membership fee to boot. 
The American Tianxia is not a tributary system on the Chinese model, only 
larger. It is, as Wang suggests, a new form of tianxia, a new ethical system for 
awarding distinction in virtually every field of human endeavor and ultimately for 
defining civilization itself. When Khong compares contemporary US international 
relations to the Ming tributary system, he focuses on only one aspect of the 
American Tianxia: state-to-state relations. But in the contemporary world-system, 
hierarchies of all kinds find their summits in the United States. Those peaks may 
be in New York (media, finance, art, fashion, publishing, philanthropy, etc.), 
Boston (education), Silicon Valley (information technology), Hollywood (film), or 
even Baltimore (medicine), but they all represent a merging of American and 
global distinction hierarchies. Nowhere is this clearer than in business. In field 
after field, success in the world means success in the United States, and vice versa. 
There are many centers of excellence in specific fields scattered all around the 
world, but in nearly every field aside from sports the preponderance of peak 
institutions are fundamentally American institutions. When peak organizations are 
not actually based in the United States or staffed by citizens of the United States, 
they are strongly influenced by American organizational models, seek recognition 
from American governing bodies, run on American software, and conduct business 
in English. This places a heavy handicap on all non-American organizations and 
individuals with ambitions to succeed on the global stage, a handicap weighed in 
direct proportion to the organization’s or individual’s cultural and political distance 
from the United States. English-speaking Canadians pay a small price to 
participate in American/global distinction hierarchies, Italians somewhat more so, 
Russians much more, and Chinese most of all. American individuals, 
organizations, and institutions reap the rewards. 
The American Tianxia is, in essence, a graded global club that people can join 
only if they behave in civilizationally-appropriate ways—and then pay a 
membership fee to boot. Proposals abound for the formation of alternative clubs, 
but the network externalities of joining the American club are so enormous that 
few people choose instead to join the Russian and Chinese clubs, despite their 
much lower membership fees. Even many elite Russians and Chinese prefer 
membership in the American club to membership in their own. Americans, of 
course, get in free—not just to their own club, but to most others as well. More 
than that, they are often paid to join. It is well-documented that US foreign direct 
investment abroad systematically earns higher returns than foreigners’ investments 
in the United States. It seems likely that a similar (if less easily measured) 
“exorbitant privilege” prevails in other fields as well. Simply put, Americans living 
in an American Tianxia don’t have to work as hard as everyone else. When it’s 
time to pay the piper, the piper pays them. 
  
The American within 
While the Ming tianxia was emphatically Confucian in ideology, the defining 
ideology of the American Tianxia is individualism. But individualism is an empty 
container. Liberal principles like human rights, democracy, and rule of law have 
evolved into a superstructure that elaborates and maintains the base principle of the 
primacy of the individual, but they have no specific content in themselves (i.e., 
what policies should democracies pursue? what should people do with their 
freedoms? what objectives should laws seek to accomplish?). All that is very 
different from Confucianism. Confucianism prescribed an extensive set of specific 
policies, actions, and objectives, particularly in its Ming-era neo-Confucian 
distillation. The American-style “pursuit of happiness” does not simply offer an 
alternative set of cultural expectations, like Indian Brahmanism or medieval 
European Christianity. American individualism is the ideology of the empty set: 
individualism is the ideology that has no tenets. 
Individualism means that even when countries have hostile relations with the 
United States, their citizens can still attend US universities, work in US companies, 
and (if they want) hope to become US citizens. Ming China used state-to-state 
relations to defend its society against foreign influences; American institutions 
self-consciously use people-to-people relationships as a tool for changing values in 
other societies. This appeal to individuals rather than states generates the ironic 
contradiction that the American Tianxia is inexorably expansionary while 
nonetheless maintaining a voluntary approach to the recruitment of new adherents. 
The United States, its corporations, its universities, and its NGOs are remarkably 
successful in exporting liberal values by offering individuals opportunities for 
personal self-advancement. Chinese elites can realistically aspire to attend US 
universities and work in US companies if they are willing to embrace an 
individualistic mindset. If they don’t conform, they won’t succeed, but that is their 
choice. This appeal to self-interest is an incredibly powerful recruitment tool. By 
contrast, in those rare instances when the United States has sought to impose 
liberal values by force (e.g., Afghanistan, Iraq), it has failed spectacularly. 
In the Ming tianxia, both economic surplus and economic actors seem to have 
leaked out of the center, toward the peripheries. The evidence for this is 
circumstantial but one-sided. Experts agree that the early Ming tributary trade 
generally benefited the tributary, not China itself. The emperor was able to 
demonstrate his superior status by bestowing gifts of visibly greater value than 
those he received in tribute from his vassals, and as a result the imperial court was 
never very concerned to promote tributary trade. Quite the contrary: the court often 
sought to discourage it, especially when they thought the prospective tributary not 
worth the political price. The imbalance between tribute received and gifts 
bestowed helped maintain the hierarchical East Asian political order centered on 
China because it made Chinese vassals understandably eager have their inferior 
status recognized, thus entitling them to send tribute. The emperor could even 
punish vassals by refusing to receive tribute from them—a “punishment” that 
makes sense only in terms of the disproportionate benefits accruing to the tribute-
giver. 
Ming China also imposed extreme punishments for attempted emigration, 
which suggests a country that people were eager to escape, not a country that 
people were eager to enter. Nonetheless, throughout the Ming period Chinese 
traders, prospectors, and ordinary farmers left the country to settle in Southeast 
Asia. There do not seem to have been major economic migration flows in the 
opposite direction. The contrast with the American Tianxia couldn’t be clearer. 
The United States is a magnet for the world’s money and talent. People and their 
money are free to leave the United States at any time, but net flows of both are 
strongly inward. The Ming tianxia promoted the interests of the state (both 
Chinese and tributary) over the interests of individuals, with the result that 
individual economic initiative had to be brutally suppressed. The American 
Tianxia, by contrast, promotes the interests of individuals, certainly over the 
interests of tributary states and sometimes over the interests of the United States 
itself. The result is another ironic contradiction: the state that puts the individual 
first may be more robust than the state that prioritized the state. 
It is often said that the twentieth century was the American century. The great 
popularizer of this idea was Henry Luce, who as publisher of Life magazine urged 
the people of the United States to fulfill what he saw as their historic destiny “to 
rise to the opportunities of leadership in the world” by joining the fight against 
Hitler. Luce’s American century didn’t start at the end of World War II. For Henry 
Luce, as for Charles Beard and for Bertrand and Dora Russell, the American 
century had begun at the start of the twentieth century, not in its middle. Luce said 
that in 1919, at the end of World War I, the United States had missed “a golden 
opportunity, an opportunity unprecedented in all history, to assume the leadership 
of the world ‒ a golden opportunity handed to us on a proverbial silver platter.” 
Luce is well-remembered for calling the twentieth century the American 
century, but he is not well-remembered for calling the twentieth century the “first” 
American century. Luce strongly implied that it would not be the last. The United 
States is a large and powerful state, but as a state it is nowhere near as predominant 
in the millennial world-system as Ming China was in the pre-modern East Asian 
world-system. The United States is only able to act as the central state of a 
global tianxiabecause it has successfully disaggregated the world into individuals. 
For this it was uniquely (one might say fortuitously) prepared by its founding focus 
on “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.” The US Declaration of 
Independence takes it for granted ‒ literally, by God ‒ that governments are 
created by people “to secure these rights” for individuals. In the American 
tradition, states don’t grant rights to people; people create states to secure rights for 
themselves. 
Any state might have ended up the central state of the global world-system, or 
none. In the sixteenth century it might have been Spain, with control of half of 
Europe and most of the Americas. In the nineteenth century it might have been 
Britain, with control of half the world. In the twentieth century it might have been 
the Soviet Union, or (God forbid) Hitler’s Germany. But none of these states could 
have held the system together for very long, because none of these states held any 
appeal beyond sheer force, and none of them ever had enough sheer force to bind 
the rest of the system to itself. Only a state founded on the primacy of the 
individual and ideologically committed to freedom of opportunity for all 
individuals could succeed as the central state of a truly global world-system. 
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